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Abstract 
We refine the concept of boundary-spanning exploration, by making a distinction between explorative 
learning from partners and from non-partners (Partners are organizations with whom a focal firm has 
some kind of external venturing relations, i.e. technological alliances, corporate venturing capital, or 
M&As). These partners play a dual role: in explorative learning from partners, a firm teams up with 
external venturing partners to co-develop or transfer technology. Partners’ technology base (what they 
know) is driving explorative learning from partners. In contrast, in explorative learning from 
non-partners, partners may play a role because of whom they know. That is, they inform the firm about 
technological opportunities beyond its corporate venturing network. The empirical analysis supports 
the dual role of venturing partners in facilitating the two types of explorative learning.  
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1. Introduction 
Firms develop new businesses and products to 
secure corporate growth. To reach that goal, 
companies increasingly use knowledge from 
external sources to explore new technologies 
(e.g., Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Lavie and 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Schildt et al., 2005; Keil et al., 
2008). They explore new technologies beyond 
their existing technological capabilities (March 
1991). Exploration implies learning of new 
knowledge that does not reside within the firm 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Schildt et al., 2005; Keil et 
al., 2008). There is convincing empirical 
evidence that external technology venturing, 
including corporate venture capital (CVC) 
investments (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Keil 
et al., 2008), alliances (Gulati, 1998), and 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007), is 
instrumental for technological exploration and 
improves innovation performance (Schildt et al., 
2005; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin et al., 
2007).  
 However, corporate venturing is only a 
formalized source of firms’ explorative learning. 
Innovating firms have many other means to 
explore new technologies beyond the corporate 
boundaries. For instance, firms can learn from 
scientific publications (McMillan et al., 2000), 
patent releases, contact with consultants, 
technology providers and intermediaries 
(Howells, 2006), product introductions in the 
market, conferences, exhibitions, benchmarking 
with competitors (Wiersema and Bowen, 2008; 
Hunt and Morgan, 1997), mobility of personnel, 
etc. These are just a few examples how firms can 
explore new technologies relying on knowledge 
of organizations with whom they have no formal 
venturing partnerships. Given the multiple 
external sources of explorative learning, we can 
refine the concept of boundary-spanning 
explorative learning which was first introduced 
by Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001). We divide 
boundary-spanning explorative learning into two 
categories: companies can learn from their 
partners or they can learn from other companies 
or organizations with which they have no 
formalized partnerships.  
 Although prior studies have greatly 
contributed to our understanding of the 
relationship between external technology 
sourcing and exploration, they have mostly 
focused on firms’ exploratory learning from their 
venturing partners. We call this ‘explorative 
learning from partners’ (ELP). In this type of 
exploration, innovation companies establish 
partnerships to tap into the technological 
expertise of their technology partners. In contrast, 
there is little insight in how external technology 
sourcing partnerships may also facilitate focal 
firms’ explorative learning from other 
organizations with which they have no direct 
relationships. We call this ‘explorative learning 
from non-partners’ (ELN).  
To date, the innovation management 
literature has shown that technology sourcing 
partnerships may foster the exploratory learning 
of innovating firms directly by bringing the latter 
in contact with interesting technology sources 
they have and informing the latter about new 
technological opportunities. Our empirical data 
indicate that the emphasis in the literature on 
learning from partners is not a fair representation 
of how firms develop explorative knowledge: 
only 15 percent of the explorative patents build 
on the knowledge of the innovating firms’ direct 
venturing partners. To our knowledge, to date 
the potential dual role of external technology 
sourcing has not yet been investigated. The 
current paper aims at filling this research gap by 
investigate the effects of external technology 
venturing, including CVC, alliances, and M&As, 
on both types of explorative learning, i.e., ELP 
and ELN. 
 It is important to investigate the potential 
dual role of firms’ corporate venturing on 
explorative learning for several reasons. First, 
since firms are socially embedded within various 
social connections in an increasingly open 
innovation context, non-partnering organizations 
could be equally important external sources for 
exploration as existing partners (Chesbrough, 
2003, 2006). Second, a firm’s external 
knowledge sourcing is highly relevant to its ELN 
because the partnerships can act for the 
innovating firm as radar to detect new 
technological opportunities. They act as a prism 
(Podolny, 2001) to identify the relevance and 
complementarity of new technologies, and as a 
reputation mechanism to legitimize ELN. Finally, 
a firm’s existing relationships might alter the 
incentives and constrain the resources for ELN. 
 This study makes several contributions to 
the corporate venturing and inter-organizational 
learning literature. First, we refine the concept of 
boundary-spanning explorative learning by 
conceptually distinguishing between ELP and 
ELN. Second, we empirically investigate the 
potentially different effects of knowledge 
sourcing on firms’ ELP and ELN. Third, we 
theoretically explore and empirically test the 
effect of different governance modes on ELP and 
ELN.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. First, we introduce the concepts of 
exploration and exploitation and explain the 
difference between ELP and ELN. Second, we 
provide a theoretical background and develop 
hypotheses for the relationships among 
technology sourcing partnerships, ELP, and ELN. 
Next, we present the data and estimation 
methods to test the hypotheses. Finally, we 
discuss the results and draw some conclusions 
from our research, followed by suggestions for 
future research.  
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. The dual role of knowledge sourcing 
partnerships in technological exploration 
Previous research has shown that firms with a 
strong reliance on technologies developed 
previously have a better innovation performance. 
However, they risk their technological 
competencies becoming less relevant as newly 
emerging technologies are not detected in time. 
Research also shows that this internal orientation 
leads to the development of competency traps 
(Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal and March, 
1993) and core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992, 
1995). Firms have to acquire technological 
knowledge from external partners and the gains 
related to the internal development of technology 
are not sustainable unless the organization can 
assimilate and integrate knowledge that is 
developed externally (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001). Exploration is usually recognized as 
activities that search for unfamiliar, distant and 
remote knowledge (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; 
Benner and Tushman, 2002; Katila and Ahuja, 
2002; Nerkar, 2003). Knowledge sourcing from 
other firms is crucial for exploration as 
innovations are considered the result of a 
recombination of component elements 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992). Prior studies on 
corporate venturing and strategic alliances have 
considered exploration as a learning process to 
integrate new technologies from a firm’s 
venturing partners (Benner and Tushman, 2002; 
Schildt et al., 2005; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). 
These technology sourcing partnerships may 
have different governance modes, including 
corporate venture capital investment, strategic 
alliances, joint ventures, and mergers and 
acquisitions (Keil et al., 2008; Van de Vrande et 
al., 2009).  
 In this paper, we focus on firms’ exploration 
that move beyond local search and explore new 
technologies from other organizations. We refine 
the concept of boundary-spanning exploration by 
distinguishing two types of external sources from 
whom innovating firms can learn. Companies can 
go beyond local search by sourcing new 
technology from their partners. However, they 
can also learn from companies or organizations 
with which they have no existing relations. In 
making the distinction between two types of 
external technology sources, i.e., partners and 
non-partners, we add an extra dimension to 
boundary spanning exploration which will be 
instrumental in explaining the dual role of 
external corporate venturing partners in 
explaining technological exploration. 
 Hence, we define two types of exploration, 
i.e., explorative learning from partners (ELP) and 
from non-partners (ELN) (Sorenson and Stuart, 
2000; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). In ELP 
innovating firms learn directly from their 
technology sourcing relationships. That is, 
technology partnerships can be considered as 
‘pipes’ through which the knowledge interactions 
between partners are shaped and facilitated 
(Podolny, 2001). A pharmaceutical company 
might for instance establish an R&D agreement 
with a biotechnology start-up to learn about the 
specific knowledge of the latter in a particular 
application of functional genomics. In this case, 
we expect that the new technology developed in 
the pharmaceutical company will be (partially) 
based on the technology of the start-up company. 
In ELN the innovating company is not learning 
directly from its partners. For example, a firm can 
learn from non-partners in different ways: 
scientific publications, patent releases, contact 
with consultants and intermediaries, product 
introductions in the market, conferences, 
exhibitions, benchmarking with competitors, and 
mobility of personnel, etc. are just a few 
examples. The literature has noticed the 
importance of this type of learning (Beckman et 
al., 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006), but has 
overlooked the role of external corporate 
venturing partners can play in facilitating this 
type of explorative learning (Schildt, et al., 2005; 
Keil et al. 2008).  
 Therefore, we argue that corporate venturing 
partnerships play a dual role in the 
boundary-spanning explorative learning of 
innovating firms. We know little about how a 
firm’s venture partners may influence the 
exploratory learning from other organizations 
with whom the focal firm has no venturing 
relationships. In the following section, we 
investigate the different effects of external 
corporate venturing partnerships on ELP and 
ELN. 
2.2. External venturing and exploration 
Companies are increasingly using different types 
of cooperation mechanisms to gain technological 
knowledge outside their organizational 
boundaries. They have choices between different 
formal forms of external venturing partnerships. 
These venturing forms include corporate venture 
capital, non-equity alliances, equity alliances 
(including joint ventures), and mergers and 
acquisitions.  
 Corporate venturing investments (CVC) are 
usually flexible investments to get access to the 
knowledge of start-ups (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005). Investments in innovative start-ups may 
provide the corporation with and ensure a stake in 
novel technological opportunities. Non-equity 
alliances, including licensing, second-sourcing, 
distribution agreements and technology exchange 
agreements, refer to those technology agreements 
which do not involve an equity investment in the 
partner firm. Non-equity alliances are largely 
based on flexible contractual agreements. In 
contrast, equity alliances refer to those alliances 
that require either shared ownership, independent 
administrative, operational and incentive system 
(joint ventures), or one or more partners taking an 
equity stake in other partners’ ownership 
(minority holdings) (Gulati and Singh, 1998). 
Both non-equity and equity alliances have been 
found to be positively related to firms’ innovation 
performance because they enable firms to learn 
from their allied partners through various levels 
of cooperation (Stuart, 2000; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters 2002). Alliances that are established in 
order to search for new technologies from 
partners usually result in positive exploratory 
performance (Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2004). Finally, merger and acquisitions 
(M&As) allow the acquiring firm to get access to 
and absorb the knowledge from the acquired 
firms through ownership control. Prior research 
also found positive relationship between M&A 
and innovative performance (Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Keil, et al., 2008; Vanhaverbeke et al., 
2002). There is empirical evidence that external 
technology venturing partnerships have a direct 
positive effect on ELP (Schildt et al., 2005; Keil, 
et al., 2008; Van de Vrande et al., 2011).  
 There are several reasons why we believe 
external knowledge sourcing partnerships are 
also positively related to ELN. First, an 
innovating firm is embedded in a broader social 
network of firms with which it is directly or 
indirectly connected via its existing partnerships 
(Granovetter, 1985). The social embeddedness of 
firms provides an innovating firm not only with 
access to the knowledge base of its venturing 
partners to which it’s directly connected, but also 
the possibility to reach out to the knowledge base 
of other firms which are known by or connected 
to the focal firm’s venturing partners (Davis, 
1991; Burt, 1992). External technology sourcing 
relationships can be viewed as channels to reach 
beyond the boundary of an innovating firm’s 
direct corporate venturing networks to a larger 
range of firms and a broader knowledge pool 
(Gulati, 1998; Beckman et al., 2004; Lin et al., 
2007). Second, due to their unique knowledge 
base, knowledge sourcing partners may help the 
innovating firm to identify the relevant and 
complementary knowledge (Burt, 1992; 
Nooteboom, 2000a). In other words, external 
technology sourcing partnerships may act as 
radar to detect relevant knowledge beyond a 
firm’s network of venturing partners and they act 
as referrals concerning the usefulness of the new 
knowledge. Finally, the relationships between the 
innovating firm and its partners may affect third 
party’s perceptions of the relative trustworthiness, 
organizational capabilities and performance of 
the innovating firm (Podolny, 2001). For instance, 
if the innovating firm has an external sourcing 
relationship with a firm having superior 
reputation and performance, other firms will 
perceive the innovating firm as with great 
capability, competence and trustworthiness 
(Gulati, 1995; Nooteboom, 2000b). This, in turn, 
raises the odds for the innovating firm to explore 
new technological opportunities with firms with 
whom it had no venturing relationships before. 
Therefore, we expect that firms that are rich in 
external technology sourcing partnerships will be 
more likely to undertake ELP as well as ELN than 
those firms with few partnerships. Accordingly, 
we hypothesize 
Hypothesis 1a: The number of external 
knowledge sourcing partnerships is positively 
related to a firm’s explorative learning from 
partners (ELP). 
Hypothesis 1b: The number of external 
knowledge sourcing partnerships is positively 
related to a firm’s explorative learning from 
non-partners (ELN).  
 Furthermore, we are also curious about 
whether the strength of the hypothesized effect is 
different for the two types of exploration. First, 
external partnerships provide the innovating firm 
with direct connections and formalized relations 
with its partners. Knowledge exchange in ELP is 
based on a certain level of reciprocity (Kachra 
and White, 2008) and regulated by a particular 
contractual agreement (Gulati, 1998). 
Contractual arrangements are instrumental in 
optimizing the technological cooperation and 
transfer of knowledge. However, knowledge 
exchange in ELN is not based on a contractual 
agreement. This, in turn, leads to a less structured 
and controlled way to assimilate and integrate 
knowledge from these organizations. Second, 
although a great number of external partners may 
increase the chance that novel and 
complementary technological knowledge will be 
identified and effectively utilized by the 
innovating firm, this might not always be the case 
because an innovating firm has to rely on the 
network resources and technological capabilities 
of its partners (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1996) to profit from ELN. A firm’s technology 
sourcing partners vary in terms of their size, age, 
competitive position, product diversity, and 
financial resources (Shan, 1990; Burgers et al., 
1993): their capabilities to facilitate the 
innovating firm to undertake ELN may differ as 
well. Finally, an innovating firm with many 
external partnerships may be conceived by other 
firms as competitive in many industries and 
markets. Thus, firms, which have no venturing 
relationships with the innovating firm, may 
consider the former as a potential competitor and 
prevent their technologies from spilling over to 
the innovating focal firm (Schrader, 1991; Chang 
and Xu, 2008). In sum, we expect that the 
positive effect of external corporate venturing 
will be larger for ELP than for ELN. Accordingly, 
we hypothesize, 
Hypothesis 1c: The positive impact of the number 
of external knowledge sourcing partnerships on 
ELP is stronger than its impact on ELN.  
2.3. Governance modes of corporate venturing 
and exploratory learning 
External knowledge sourcing partnerships differ 
in terms of governance modes. Firms have the 
choice between different levels of hierarchical 
control and intensity of integration. Prior research 
on contract choices in corporate venturing has 
been influenced primarily by the transaction cost 
theory (Gulati, 1998). The interactive nature of 
innovation and organizational learning requires 
appropriate governance to realize the potential of 
inter-organizational relationships and control the 
relational risks (Nooteboom 2004a, 2004b, Gulati 
et al. 2000).  
 The different governance modes of external 
technology sourcing (CVC, equity and 
non-equity alliances and M&As) can be ranked 
according to the degree of integration between 
the partners. Previous studies have argued that 
these modes of collaboration can be ranked along 
the continuum between arms-length transactions 
and a fully integrated solution (Gulati and Singh, 
1998; Santoro and McGill, 2005). In line with 
this idea, CVCs can be considered as the type of 
partnership that resembles most arms-length 
relationships among all these governance modes. 
M&As, on the contrary, require a full integration 
between the acquirer and acquired firm (Schildt 
et al., 2005; Van de Vrande et al., 2009). 
Alliances are positioned in the middle of the 
continuum. For non-equity alliances, 
coordination among partners is based on a 
contract. Members of the partners work jointly on 
behalf of their own organization. Equity alliances 
represent a somewhat more integrated form of 
governance because of the equity investments of 
the partners. In the case of joint ventures there is a 
separate entity created by alliance partners. It 
requires not only specific equity investments, but 
also a tight coordination between alliance 
partners because a separate administrative, 
operational and incentive system needs to be 
established (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Empirical 
evidence shows that governance modes that are 
appropriately aligned with the transaction 
requirements lead to enhanced innovation 
performance (Geyskens et al., 2006). As 
exploration usually entails high levels of 
uncertainty, less integrated governance modes are 
more likely to be the appropriate (Schilt et al., 
2005; Van de Vrande et al., 2009; Gilsing and 
Nooteboom, 2006). However, the relationship 
between the integration levels of governance 
modes in external technology sourcing on the one 
hand and a firm’s ELP and ELN on the other hand, 
has received little attention in the literature. 
 The existing literature has argued that higher 
levels of integration of governance modes of 
external technology sourcing are less likely to 
lead to explorative learning from partners 
because of the uncertain nature of the returns to 
this type of learning (compared to exploitative 
learning) and the uncertainty ex ante about the 
strategic importance and operational relatedness 
of the ventures (Schildt, et al., 2005). In this case, 
innovating firms tend to form venturing 
partnerships using governance modes with low 
levels of commitment in order to remain flexible. 
In a similar vein, we argue that (low) high levels 
of integration in the governance modes of 
external corporate venturing may lead to (more) 
less ELN. High levels of integration in 
governance modes entail more specific 
investments in the venturing relationships. This 
implies that the innovating firm has less 
flexibility to step out of existing venturing 
relationships. This flexibility is also necessary in 
the case of ELN, because technological 
opportunities may change recurrently. As a result, 
an innovating firm can profit from loose ties, 
which can be easily established or dissolved 
when new technological opportunities emerge, 
with its partners. When an innovating firm is tied 
to its partners through highly integrated relations 
that are hard to reverse, it may not have the 
required flexibility to explore new opportunities 
as it is linked for a longer time to partners through 
strong ties (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). 
Accordingly, we hypothesize  
Hypothesis 2a: Lower levels of integration of the 
governance modes of external knowledge 
sourcing will increase a firm’s performance on 
both ELP and ELN.  
 In contrast to the arguments above, the theory 
of transaction cost economics (TCE) argues that 
under high uncertainty firms prefer more 
integrated governance modes for their exchange 
relationships to control for transaction hazards 
and risks of spillovers (Williamson 1975, 1991). 
Since exploratory learning between firms is 
highly uncertain in terms of returns, TCE predicts 
that exploration from partners requires 
hierarchical and integrative governance modes 
(Pisano, 1989). There are also reasons to expect 
that not only ELP but also ELN may benefit from 
high levels of integration in the governance 
modes of knowledge sourcing partnerships. 
Partners inform the innovating firm about 
opportunities beyond the current network and the 
question is whether the governance mode has an 
impact on the richness and the quality of the 
information. Different governance modes provide 
the innovating firm with different types of 
information about technological opportunities 
because partners are different and they might 
focus on technologies in different stages of the 
technology life cycle. Integrated modes also offer 
more fine-grained information about the 
opportunities compared to less integrated modes. 
Therefore, we argue that more integrated modes 
will lead to rich and adequate information 
between an innovating firm and its partners, 
which, in turn will inform the former more 
accurately about opportunities beyond the 
existing network. In this way, the innovating firm 
can increase its ELN. For these reasons, we 
formulate an alternative hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2b: Higher levels of integration of the 
governance modes of external knowledge 
sourcing will increase a firm’s performance on 
both ELP and ELN. 
 
3. DATA, VARIABLES AND METHOD 
3.1. Data and sample 
To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of 153 
firms that were active in the pharmaceutical 
industry between 1990 and 2000. The dataset was 
constructed in the following way. For each year 
of the observation period, the largest 200 
companies in the industry were collected. The 
pharmaceutical industry consists of mainly two 
types of firms: generic drug companies and 
innovators. To distinguish between those, the 
selection was based on firms’ prior patents in the 
pharmaceutical industry. That is, the selection 
was based on patents filed in the following patent 
classes 424, 435, 436, 514, 530, 536, 800, and 
930 as defined by the USPTO (Rothaermel and 
Hess, 2007; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2007). 
Large organizations are more likely to engage in 
external technology sourcing activities and are 
more likely to report them publicly (Keil et al., 
2008). Prior research on alliances and 
acquisitions has for that reason also focused on 
the largest organizations in the industry (Ahuja, 
2000; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Garguilo, 1999; 
Hitt et al., 1997; Keil et al., 2008). After selecting 
the companies with patents in the relevant patent 
classes, research institutes and universities were 
removed from the sample. Next, the remaining 
sample was manually checked for parents and 
affiliates using Dun & Bradstreet's Who Owns 
Whom, which were then aggregated on the parent 
company level. After checking for duplicates, this 
leads to 153 independent firms in the sample, 
which will be referred to as ‘focal firms’ to 
distinguish them from their partners.  
 Next, we have gathered for these firms all the 
CVC investments, technology alliances, minority 
holdings, joint ventures, and merger and 
acquisition activities during the period of 
1985-2000, which allows us to calculate some of 
the independent variables using a five-year time 
lag. Furthermore, we collected patent data and 
financial information. Corporate venture capital 
data was derived from the Thomson 
VentureXpert database. Data concerning 
alliances and joint ventures was obtained from 
the MERIT-CATI databank on Cooperative 
Agreements and Technology Indicators 
(Hagedoorn, 1993). We used Thomson ONE 
Banker to collect information regarding the 
companies' M&A activity. Both the collected 
alliances and corporate venture capital 
investments have a strong technology component, 
therefore, to make a consistent sample selection 
for all types of governance modes, we only 
included technological M&As in our sample, 
adapting the method by Ahuja and Katila (2001). 
 Patent information was collected for all firms 
included in our sample using data from the US 
Patent and Trademark Office. Because the US 
Patent and Trademark Office grants patents both 
on subsidiary and on parent company level (Patel 
and Pavitt, 1997), and the organizational level on 
which patents are applied for differs between 
companies, we consolidated the patents on parent 
company level for each observation year, using 
Who Owns Whom by Dun & Bradstreet. In 
addition to that, we gathered financial data using 
Worldscope, including sales, research and 
development expenses and the number of 
employees.  
3.2. Variables 
Dependent variables 
We make a distinction between two types of 
dependent variables: explorative learning from 
partners (ELP) and explorative learning from 
non-partners (ELN). We refer to Figure 1 to 
explain the distinction between both variables in 
detail. This figure illustrates how we categorize 
different types of learning by tracking the 
backward citations of new patents of an 
innovating firm in a particular year. When 
companies build on prior technological 
knowledge, new patents must cite existing 
patents on which it builds. As a result, patent 
citations provide us with a unique and reliable 
instrument to define different types of exploration. 
This taxonomy is based on the assumption that 
when firms innovate, they usually build on 
existing technologies developed by their own or 
by other organizations (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Katila, 2002).  
Does a new patent in year t 
has backward citations?
No = Pioneering technologyYes
Yes = Explorative learning 
from partners (ELP)
No 
Does it cite its 
own patents?
Yes = exploitative learning
No = Explorative learning from 
non-partners (ELN)
Does it cite patents 
from partners?
 
Figure 1. How to distinguish between ELP and ELN 
 
Next, we can distinguish between two different 
situations when a new patent cites prior patents. 
On the one hand, a new patent can cite some of 
the assignee’s own patents. This implies that the 
new patent builds on the firm’s prior technical 
expertise and, as a result, the patent will have one 
or more self-citations. This type of patents is 
characterized as exploitative learning (Benner 
and Tushman, 2002; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; 
Schildt et al., 2005). In other cases a firm can 
successfully file new patents that do not cite any 
of its own prior art. When an innovating firm’s 
new patents have no backward self-citations, the 
firm explores new technological areas and 
broadens its technological capabilities by 
building on the knowledge from other 
organizations. Patents with no self-citations but 
citing patents from other firms are considered to 
be more explorative than those that also cite own 
prior technology. These patents are important to 
avoid potential problems related to local search 
(March and Simon, 1958; Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Helfat, 1994).   
 So far, we have only been summarizing some 
of the existing definitions of technological 
exploitation and exploration. This study 
contributes to the literature by further segmenting 
the exploratory patents into two subcategories. 
On the one hand, a patent is categorized as an 
ELP-patent when there are no self-citations and 
when some backward citations refer to those 
organizations that have established one or more 
venturing relationships with the innovating firm 
during the 5 years prior to the observation year 
(Benner and Tushman, 2002; Schildt, et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, a patent is categorized as an 
ELN-patent when there are no self-citations and 
when there are only backward citations referring 
to organizations with whom the innovating firm 
had no formal relationships during the last 5 years. 
More specifically, we counted for in every 
observation year the number of times each 
technology-sourcing mode was established in the 
five years prior to the observation year (t-1 to t-5). 
This moving window approach is considered to 
be an appropriate timeframe during which the 
existing portfolio of external technology 
activities is likely to have an influence on the 
current technological performance of a firm 
(Kogut, 1988, 1989; Gulati, 1995). 
 Both dependent variables are count variables. 
ELP is calculated as the sum of patents 
successfully applied for per year by the focal firm, 
which have at least one citation to its partner’s 
prior patents, but no citations to its own prior 
patents. ELN is calculated as the number of 
patents successfully applied for per year by the 
focal firm which neither cites its own prior 
patents nor its partners’ prior patents. In our 
sample, there are 171,532 patents in total, of 
which 101,228 can be categorized as exploitative 
patents and 70,304 as exploratory patents; 15 
percent of the exploratory patents cite partners’ 
prior patents (ELP).  
Independent variables 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a and 2b predict a direct 
positive effect of CVC investments, non-equity 
alliances, equity alliances, M&As on ELP as well 
as on ELN. Therefore, for every observation year 
t, we counted the number of CVC investments, 
non-equity alliances, equity alliances and M&As 
respectively in the five years prior to the 
observation year (t-1 to t-5). We took a five-year 
moving window in line with the arguments 
developed above. This variables measure the 
effect of corporate venturing on the two types of 
explorative learning.  
Control variables 
Firm size: Firms of different sizes innovate 
differently. Large firms usually have more 
external corporate venturing partnerships and are 
more centrally positioned in their venturing 
networks than small firms. They also have greater 
capacity to cooperate in multiple tasks, which is 
crucial for inter-organizational learning and 
absorptive capacity (e.g., Shan, 1990; Powell and 
Brantley, 1992). Large firms are found to 
undertake exploitative and exploratory learning 
at the same time whereas small firms can 
maximize innovative performance by adopting a 
focused approach on exploitation or exploration 
(Beckman et al. 2004, Stuart 2000; Lin et al., 
2007). Approaching exploration in a different 
way, Almeida and Kogut (1997) suggest that 
smaller firms explore new technological 
opportunities that are ignored by larger ones. 
Small companies may be more likely to explore 
new technological areas with focused strategy in 
less crowded areas (Lin et al., 2007; Almeida and 
Kogut, 1997). Since explorative learning from 
non-partners involves higher levels of uncertainty 
because the learning process is not embedded in 
formal partnerships, we can argue in line with 
Almeida and Kogut (1997) that small firms will 
be relatively more inclined to explore from 
non-partners than from partners. We measure 
firm size as the natural logarithm of sales of the 
innovating firms. 
 R&D intensity: Prior research has indicated a 
strong relationship between R&D inputs and 
innovation, and regarded R&D expenditures as a 
means to maintain absorptive capacity necessary 
to benefit from external technology sourcing 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Consequently, we 
include R&D expenditures as a percentage of 
sales as a control variable. The control variables 
size and R&D intensity are lagged by one year. 
 Technological distance: Another important 
factor to control for is the technological distance 
between the focal firm and its venturing partners 
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Nerkar and Roberts, 
2004; Phene et al., 2006; Nooteboom et al. 2007). 
Technological distance refers to the (lack of) 
overlap between the knowledge base of the focal 
company and the knowledge base of the 
partnering firms. We use the method developed 
by Jaffe (1986) to calculate the technological 
proximity between two firms (i and j). Following 
this method, the technological proximity between 
two firms is computed as the uncentered 
correlation between their respective vectors of 
technological capital (measured as the 
cumulative patent applications in technology 
class k over the five years prior to the investment), 
Pik and Pjk respectively:  
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The technological proximity (Tij) measure takes a 
value between 0 and 1 according to their common 
technological interests. To calculate 
technological distance, this variable is 
transformed into a new one, which equals 1-Tij. 
 Technological age: Technological age is 
another firm-level control variable. To measure it, 
we first measure the technological newness of a 
firm’s patent portfolio. Technological newness is 
operationalized in two steps (Van de Vrande et al., 
2009). First, we determine the “age of all patent 
classes”. This is calculated as the median of the 
age of all patents in a patent class in a particular 
year. The age of the patent is the time elapsed 
between the application year and the year of 
observation. To overcome outlier bias, we use the 
median age rather than the average to calculate 
the age. Second, to calculate the average 
technological age of a firm, we multiply the share 
of patent applications by the technology age for 
each patent class. We control for the 
technological age of firms for the following 
reason: If a firm has a relevantly young portfolio 
of patents, it holds some technologies that are in 
the early phase of the life cycle. These 
technologies usually entail high technological 
uncertainty but also ample opportunities for 
technological exploration. As a result, we expect 
that technological age will be negatively related 
to both types of technological learning.    
 We also included several types of dummy 
variables. Focal firms are companies that are 
based in America, Europe, or Asia. Companies on 
different continents may have a different attitude 
towards explorative research due to the 
differences in their cultural and institutional 
background. Consequently, we introduce two 
dummy variables to control for the geographic 
location of the focal firms (firms based in 
America are set as default). We also introduced a 
dummy variable to control for industries. 
Because the sample consists of firms in both 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries, we use a 
dummy variable to control for differences in 
explorative research between the two industries. 
Finally, we included dummy variables to control 
for the unobserved effects of time in each 
consecutive year. 
3.3. Method 
The dependent variables, explorative learning 
from partners and non-partners, are count 
variables. A Poisson regression approach 
provides a natural baseline model for such data 
(Hausman et al., 1984; Henderson and Cockburn, 
1996; Long and Freese, 2003). However, Poisson 
regressions assume that the mean and variance of 
the event count are equal. This assumption is 
likely to be violated since overdispersion usually 
occurs in patents. Because our data shows 
significant evidence of overdispersion (i.e. the 
variance exceeds the mean), a negative binomial 
regression model is more appropriate (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1998). The negative binomial model 
for panel data is estimated using the XTNBREG 
command in STATA. 
 To determine whether a random- or 
fixed-effects model is more appropriate approach 
for the analysis, we further conducted a Hausman 
specification test (1978) upon the baseline model. 
The Hausman test was not significant, indicating 
that it is appropriate to use a random-effects 
model as an alternative for the fixed-effects 
model. Since random-effects model do not 
control for time-invariant variables (i.e., variables 
that differ between cases but remain constant 
over time), we include dummy variables to 
control for unobserved effects of industry and 
geographic regions.  
 
4. RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and correlations 
between the variables for the 898 firm-year 
observations in the sample are presented in Table 
1.  The correlation between equity alliances and 
non-equity alliances is high (with a coefficient of 
0.7145), which may cause multicollinearity 
problems. For this reason, we did not run the full 
model including all the different governance 
modes along with the control variables. Instead, 
we ran several models that include only one 
single governance mode in order to examine the 
effects of each type of governance mode on the 
two types of explorative learning separately. Next, 
we estimated two proxies of the full model. The 
first one includes CVC, equity alliances and 
M&As, and the second one model contains CVC, 
non-equity alliances and M&As, besides the 
control variables (see Table 1 and Table 2). In this 
way, equity alliance and non-equity alliances are 
not included simultaneously in a single model.  
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression 
analysis using random-effects negative binomial 
estimations of the two types of exploration. The 
dependent variable in Models 1 to 7 is ELP. The 
results for ELN are represented in Models 8 to 14. 
The baseline models (respectively, Models 1 and 
8) include the linear effects of the control 
variables. Hypotheses 1a and 1b predict that the 
number of external sourcing relationships, 
including CVC, non-equity alliances, equity 
alliances, and M&A, are positively associated 
with both types of explorative learning. In Table 2, 
Models 2 to 5 show that all types of external 
governance modes are positively related to ELP 
(the coefficients are significant at various levels). 
Models 9 through 12 reveal that most types of 
external governance modes have a positive effect 
on ELN. The exception is equity alliances (Model 
10). As a result, we found strong support for 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b (except for the effect of 
equity alliances on ELN). These findings support 
our claim that innovation partners play a dual role 
in technological exploration.  
 Hypothesis 1c predicts that the positive effect 
of the number of knowledge sourcing relations on 
ELP is stronger than the effect on ELN. We find 
that the coefficients of each governance mode in 
the models explaining ELP are larger than the 
corresponding ones in the models for ELN. 
Hence, we find empirical support for Hypothesis 
1c. This finding implies that the positive effect of 
external venturing partnerships on explorative 
learning from partners is stronger compared to 
the learning from non-partners. The stronger 
effect on ELP can be explained through the 
contractual arrangements and the management of 
the formal agreement(s) between the partners. 
 Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict the relationship 
between levels of integration in the governance 
modes of external knowledge sourcing and 
explorative learning with partners and 
non-partners from two seemingly conflicting 
perspectives. To test these two hypotheses, we 
included different types of governance modes 
into the semi-full models of Table 2. In Models 6 
(for ELP) and 13 (for ELN), CVCs, equity 
alliances and M&As are included. Alternatively, 
in Model 7 (for ELP) and 14 (for ELN), we 
inserted CVCs, non-equity alliances and M&As. 
The results in Models 6 and 7 indicate that more 
integrated governance modes have a stronger 
positive impact on ELP. The results in Models 13 
and 14 also confirm that more integrated 
governance modes have a stronger positive effect 
on ELN (except for equity alliances in Model 13). 
However, the effect is not as pronounced as the 
results in Model 7 for ELP. In sum, we can 
conclude that M&As have a stronger effect on 
both types of explorative learning than alliances, 
and alliances are in turn more appropriate for ELP 
and ELN than CVC. In other words, we find 
support for the traditional governance perspective, 
i.e., Hypothesis 2b, which argues that the risky 
and uncertain nature of exploration requires more 
integrated governance modes. Innovating firms 
need some specific investment to develop mutual 
understanding, to cross-cognitive distance 
(Nooteboom, 1999).  
  Finally, it is also interesting to have a look 
at the results of several control variables in Table 
2. Firm size has a positive and significant effect in 
all models for ELP as well as for ELN. Recall that 
firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of 
sales so that the coefficient in a negative binomial 
regression model can be considered as elasticity. 
The fact that the coefficients of firm size 
consistently are positive but less than one implies 
that smaller firms are relatively more innovative 
than larger firms in both types of explorative 
search. Next, the coefficients of R&D intensity 
are positive and significant in all models for both 
types of explorative learning (except for Model 7), 
which suggests that R&D investments facilitate 
firms’ explorative search. However, R&D 
intensity has a substantially larger effect on ELP 
compared to ELN. The stronger relation between 
R&D investments and ELP is not surprising: 
When firms establish technology partnerships, 
explorative learning from the partners will 
increase more when the partnering firms are 
investing more in their collaborative innovation 
efforts. In the case of ELN, more R&D 
investments do not necessarily facilitate learning 
from companies that are not partners of the focal 
company. If firms invest for instance more in 
their scouting of new technologies they may find 
relevant innovations and ideas that can foster 
ELN. However, the relationship between R&D 
investments and ELN will be much weaker 
compared to the case where a company spends 
more on R&D as a result of new knowledge 
sourcing relations with its innovation partners.   
  
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the dual role of external 
technology sourcing, including corporate venture 
capital (CVC), alliances and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), on two different types of 
exploratory learning – exploration from partners 
(ELP) and exploration from non-partners (ELN). 
They represent two different types of innovation 
strategies that tackle the problem of local search 
in a different way. The empirical results of this 
study provide support for the idea that external 
partners not only give the focal firm access to 
their technological capabilities, but they are also 
instrumental in the focal firm’s search to explore 
new technologies beyond its current network of 
partners. In the first case (ELP), the expertise of 
the partners determines the outcome of the focal 
firm’s explorative learning. In the second case 
(ELN), it is the reputation of the firm’s partners 
and the information gained through who they 
know, that leads to more explorative learning. 
This confirms the dual role of corporate venturing 
partnerships.  
 Next, we found that the positive effect of 
venturing partnerships on ELN is less 
pronounced than on ELP. This outcome is not 
surprising since ELP is based on direct 
information flows between the firm and its 
partners: they can structure the governance of 
their relationship to maximize the explorative 
learning. Partners help the focal firms also to 
explore from organizations that are not part of the 
venturing partner network. The risks associated 
with this type of learning cannot be directly 
controlled by the governance mechanisms and 
management of venturing partnerships. We also 
found that the risky and uncertain nature of 
explorative learning requires highly integrated 
governance modes. Finally, increasing 
technological distance between the focal 
innovating firm and its corporate venturing 
partners from a low to moderate level enhances 
ELP, while an increase from a moderate to a high 
level will hamper it. Our findings also suggest 
that the increase of technological distance 
between the focal innovating firm and its 
venturing partners is associated with a decrease in 
ELN. This implies that technological proximity 
with venturing partners is important to improve 
ELN.  
 Next, we would like to point at some broader 
implications of our research and to lay out some 
directions for future research about 
organizational boundary spanning exploration. 
First, we did not examine whether there are 
complementarities or tradeoffs between the two 
types of explorative learning. Tradeoffs might be 
induced by budget restrictions and inertia through 
path dependent learning. The two types of 
explorative learning may be complementary 
because management might eventually benefit 
from strategically balancing different types of 
exploration. From a resource-based view, 
resource allocation is a strategic choice when 
available resources in a firm are limited. 
Resource allocation requires budgeting, which 
inevitably involves rankings of alternatives. 
Some projects are deemed more important than 
others and are awarded a larger share of available 
funds and management attention (Simons, 2006). 
Suppose a firm intends to enhance innovative 
performance by exploring new technology 
opportunities from external sources, top 
management might downplay learning from 
non-partners in favor of exploration from 
venturing partners because of budget restrictions. 
Tradeoffs may be also induced through 
organizational inertia.  The outcome of a prior 
strategic action will reinforce and shape new 
choices according to the organizational learning 
literature (Levitt and March, 1988). Choices that 
lead to positive outcomes are reinforced, while 
the choices that lead to negative outcome will be 
avoided. Due to this path dependence in decision 
making, we propose that firms that gain positive 
experience in explorative learning from partners 
will continue to invest in this type of learning and 
pay less attention to learning from non-partners. 
Finally, the two types of exploration may be 
complements: Firms have to balance exploitation 
and exploration (March, 1991; Lin et al. 2007), 
but they may also benefit from balancing two 
types of exploration. Their focus and objectives 
are different and they jointly leverage external 
relationships, increasing in this way the 
effectiveness of the innovation process.  
 Other opportunities may be related to the 
operationalization of the two types of exploration. 
We have been using both concepts in an exclusive 
way. A patent that cites prior patents of partners is 
categorized as learning from partners, 
irrespective of the number of citations to 
non-partners. The analysis can be improved by 
developing more sophisticated, continuous 
variables that range between 100% partner 
citations and 100% non-partner citations. Our 
current study on exploration can also be easily 
extended to exploration to both organizational 
and technological boundary spanning (Rosenkopf 
and Nerkar, 2003). We only focused on 
exploration as an organizational boundary 
spanning activity. Including technological 
boundary-spanning adds complexity and will 
certainly enrich the analysis.  
 Finally, extending the types of relationships 
between partners (e.g. licensing, arm’s length 
R&D-contracting, patent search, informal / 
personal contacts, etc.) may of course also help to 
get a more accurate picture how external sources 
of knowledge enhance firms’ explorative learning. 
In a similar vein, one can introduce partners’ 
partners and check whether the “non-partners” 
are indirectly linked to the focal firm or not. As 
shown in the alliance literature (Ahuja, 2000; 
Hagedoorn; Letterie and Palm, 2011), a firm’s 
partners’ partners may also be an important 
source of external knowledge  
 This study also has several managerial 
implications. First, managers who encourage 
explorative learning should establish external 
knowledge sourcing relations for two reasons. 
Partners can be interesting because of their 
technology base, but they are also helpful in 
finding technology sources beyond its partner 
network. Managers should take into account that 
by establishing relations with technology partners, 
they will not only have access to the technology 
of these partners, but they also will be informed 
about technologies, business opportunities, and 
organizations, which can extend the firm’s 
explorative learning beyond the point of what can 
be learned directly from the partners’ 
technological knowledge. We hope that our 
investigation of the dual role of partners’ 
explorative learning may provide new insights for 
inter-organizational learning in general and for 
technological exploration in particular.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and Correlations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. ELP 1             
2. ELN 0.5205 1            
3. Firm size 0.2851    0.2685    1           
4. R&D intensity -0.0421 -0.0968   -0.3448    1          
5. Technological age 0.0207    0.0384    0.0233   -0.2443    1         
6. Dummy Europe 0.0238    0.1909   -0.1737    0.0082    0.1648    1        
7. Dummy Japan 0.1128   -0.0583    0.7589   -0.0456   -0.1615   -0.3356    1       
8. Dummy Industry -0.2035   -0.1776   -0.0311    0.2820   -0.4182   0.1153    0.1423    1      
9. Tech. distance -0.0657    0.1216   -0.1090   -0.1061    0.2131    0.0614    -0.1884   -0.1906    1     
10. CVC 0.1085    0.1739   -0.0191   -0.0080   -0.0778    -0.0538   -0.1319   -0.0584    0.0785   1    
11. Non-equity alliances 0.6676    0.4754    0.1231   -0.0414    0.0138   0.1095   -0.1131   -0.1548    -0.0007    0.2749    1   
12. Equity alliances 0.6511    0.4858    0.1854   -0.0643    0.0403    0.0409   -0.0599   -0.2120    0.0059    0.2925    0.7145    1  
13. M&As  0.2148    0.3625    0.0107   -0.1404    0.2029    0.1915   -0.3121   -0.2259    0.1615    0.3739    0.3574    0.3650 1 
Mean 11.8207 57.2861 9.7471 0.1738 10.2763 0.2984 0.2093 0.4788 0.7159 0.7438 6.6748 2.8596 2.9365 
s.d.  51.5243 67.2342 2.1310 0.1738 1.9784 0.4578 0.4070 0.4998 0.1882 2.8199           12.8809 4.9199 3.7388 
Table 2: Random-effects negative binomial estimations for ELP and ELN (with the linear effects of control variables in the baseline model) 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
 ELP ELP ELP ELP ELP ELP ELP ELN ELN ELN ELN ELN ELN ELN 
Size 0.596 0.576 0.554 0.503 0.495 0.411 0.375 0.408 0.403 0.422 0.401 0.384 0.388 0.371 
 (0.101)*** (0.101)*** (0.100)*** (0.103)*** (0.104)*** (0.103)*** (0.102)*** (0.040)*** (0.040)*** (0.042)*** (0.041)*** (0.040)*** (0.043)*** (0.041)*** 
R&D 1.522 1.517 1.348 1.227 1.328 1.031 0.984 0.744 0.738 0.79 0.729 0.69 0.713 0.668 
 (0.623)** (0.628)** (0.613)** (0.615)** (0.625)** (0.612)* (0.604) (0.229)*** (0.229)*** (0.232)*** (0.230)*** (0.226)*** (0.231)*** (0.227)*** 
Europe 0.222 0.267 0.139 0.275 0.214 0.061 0.175 0.077 0.099 0.081 0.062 0.025 0.053 -0.009 
 (0.242) (0.244) (0.237) (0.234) (0.238) (0.235) (0.229) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) (0.133) 
Japan 3.878 -3.728 -3.686 -3.579 -3.263 -2.905 -2.884 -1.764 -1.726 -1.813 -1.703 -1.706 -1.703 -1.608 
 (0.569)*** (0.573)*** (0.561)*** (0.559)*** (0.589)*** (0.573)*** (0.559)*** (0.248)*** (0.249)*** (0.252)*** (0.248)*** (0.246)*** (0.251)*** (0.246)*** 
Pharma. Ind. -1.428 -1.402 -1.307 -1.284 -1.454 -1.272 -1.275 -0.143 -0.143 -0.166 -0.111 -0.112 -0.127 -0.072 
 (0.228)*** (0.229)*** (0.231)*** (0.227)*** (0.229)*** (0.229)*** (0.224)*** (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) 
Tech. age -0.077 -0.06 -0.075 -0.054 -0.069 -0.062 -0.038 -0.031 -0.028 -0.031 -0.025 -0.033 -0.03 -0.025 
 (0.043)* (0.044) (0.043)* (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)* (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)* 
Tech. distance -1.372 -1.422 -1.07 -1.001 -1.739 -1.351 -1.364 -0.225 -0.232 -0.245 -0.203 -0.275 -0.285 -0.256 
 (0.423)*** (0.423)*** (0.448)** (0.443)** (0.439)*** (0.456)*** (0.457)*** (0.118)* (0.117)** (0.118)** (0.119)* (0.119)** (0.119)** (0.120)** 
CVC  0.017    0.001 -0.01  0.008    0.006 0.001 
  (0.009)*    (0.009) (0.009)  (0.004)**    (0.004) (0.004) 
Equity alliances   0.005   0.008    -0.002   -0.001  
   (0.002)**   (0.002)***    (0.001)   (0.001)  
M&A    0.02  0.047 0.059    0.007  0.015 0.022 
    (0.006)***  (0.010)*** (0.010)***    (0.003)***  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Non-equity 
alliances 
   0.038  0.032     0.018  0.010 
     (0.009)***  (0.006)***     (0.005)***  (0.003)*** 
Constant -2.645 -2.684 -2.735 -2.594 -1.562 -1.534 -1.416 -0.793 -0.793 -0.86 -0.846 -0.533 -0.588 -0.570 
 (1.055)** (1.058)** (1.039)*** (1.058)** (1.112) (1.099) (1.105) (0.392)** (0.390)** (0.397)** (0.396)** (0.395) (0.404) (0.398) 
log lik -1427.57 -1425.87 -1425.32 -1422.07 -1419.57 -1413.57 -1406.95 -3761.79 -3760.04 -3761.02 -3758.73 -3755.57 -3754.62 -3749.39 
lr-test  3.28* 4.38** 10.88 *** 15.88 *** 27.87 *** 41.41 ***  3.51* 1.55 6.13** 12.46 *** 14.36 *** 24.81 *** 
N=898; Dummy variables of year is included but not listed in the table; Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
